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THE TRAGIC FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
LOUIS E. WOLCHER*
I. PREPARING FOR THE JOURNEY
In these pages, an attempt will be made to think philosophically
about a phenomenon that precedes all possible foundations for human
rights. I refer to a persistent longing, in the hearts of those who seek to
realize the so-called “Rights of Man,” for a foundation that would ground
the passage from the idea of universal human rights to their enactment in
practice. If modernism is defined as a continuation of the Enlightenment
project of progress grounded in reason,1 then the longing to put human
rights on top of a secure foundation (from the Latin fundus, meaning
“bottom”) is a quintessentially modernist desire. Contrariwise, if
postmodernism is defined as waging war on totality and bearing witness
to the unrepresentable, then the readiness to deconstruct any foundation
that reason offers to support its human rights practices is an undeniably
postmodern stance. Given the framework that is established by these
definitions, it must be admitted that this essay is not modernist in
inspiration, for it questions the very idea of foundations. On the other
hand, it would also not be right to call the essay postmodern, for it is not
interested in proving what has already been amply demonstrated, over
and over again: that, given the right context and enough ingenuity, any
textual foundation can be made to lead just about anywhere that humans
are inclined to take it. As I see it, the obdurate denial of formal
lawfulness in the abstract is just as senseless as hoping to bypass one’s
presuppositions in order to “discover” the existence of formal lawfulness.
“What opposes unites,” says Heraclitus,2 and even famous anti-
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Charles I. Stone Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law, William H. Gates
Hall, Box 353020, Seattle, Washington 98195-3020, U.S.A. Telephone: (206) 543-0600. E-mail
address: wolcher@u.washington.edu.
Jean-François Lyotard, Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?, in THE CONTINENTAL
PHILOSOPHY READER 428, 437 (Richard Kearney & Mara Rainwater eds., 1996).
HERACLITUS, FRAGMENTS 15 (T.M. Robinson trans., 1987).
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foundational statements such as “Deconstruction is justice”3 betray a
longing to move to a better world on the basis of something. For if a
better world can be attempted by those who are courageous enough to
leave all textual foundations behind, in favor of a style of thinking and
talking that is careful to avoid mentioning foundations, then that style—
that way of being—itself becomes a kind of foundation.
Every thinking is a mode of possession that has its what and its
how; that is, to think is both to intend what-is-thought and to intend it in
a certain way.4 The “what” of the problem of foundations for human
rights is not adequately grasped, however, if it is conceived in terms of
the development or refutation of a particular foundational theory.
Foundation-laying and foundation-destroying are both modes of
possession of their object that begin and end in the sphere of the merely
epiphenomenal. Before thought thinks a foundation, it feels the need to
think it. Likewise, the deconstruction of a particular foundation can
never touch the phenomenon of longing that led to the foundation being
constructed in the first place. Genuine thought always begins by
proceeding towards the beginning. Thus a mode of access to the
primordial problem of foundations that would be sufficiently penetrating
and radical requires us to think the longing for foundations all the way
down to its origin.
But how? Regrettably, modern science (including social
science) cannot even experience our problem as a problem, for it is itself
a quintessential expression of the longing for foundations. Science
encounters and secures beings and events according to the stipulation
that they obey general laws that are either known or capable of becoming
known. In particular, all scientific accounts of the “human being”
(whether psychological, sociological, anthropological, or historiological)
are genetic: they explain human behavior in terms of a well-ordered
method, given in advance, that links cause and effect, and motive (either
conscious or “unconscious”) and action. To borrow an image from the
great French phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard, the scientist “explains
the flower by the fertilizer,” and is always predisposed to abandon
ontological investigation in favor of “dig[ging] into the past of man.”5
Freud’s attempt to understand the mystic’s “oceanic feeling” as a mere
3

4

5

Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The ““Mystical Foundation of Authority”, 11 CARDOZO L. REV.
919, 945 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990).
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ARISTOTLE 16 (Richard
Rojcewicz trans., 2001).
GASTON BACHELARD, THE POETICS OF SPACE xxvi (Maria Jolas trans., 1969).
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effect of certain childhood experiences is a good example of this sort of
account,6 for the imputation of an experience to its physical or
psychological causes leaves the nature of the experience itself—the
experience as lived—completely un-thought. As Wittgenstein puts it,
“People who are constantly asking ‘why’ are like tourists who stand in
front of a building reading Baedeker and are so busy reading the history
of its construction, etc., that they are prevented from seeing the
building.”7 The scientific way of thinking always tries to make the
unexplained explicable in terms of something else that is understandable
(and hence beyond questioning)—something else that the unexplained
phenomenon itself is not. In imputing every flower to its fertilizer,
science (including the kind of thinking that conceives of law as a
science) manifests an acute longing for a state of affairs in which every
natural and social “fact” or “process” has come to rest securely on the
bottom of its explanandum.
The longing for foundations in its deepest sense therefore poses a
problem that is philosophical and not scientific. At one level it manifests
what Spinoza calls conatus essendi: the tendency of any being, in this
case thought itself, to persevere in its being.8 When thought thinks “A Y
B,” it clings to a movement from ground to grounded that circumscribes
it as a unity, as the thought that it is. Launched on its fateful course by
Descartes, modernity conceives of the thinking subject as a stable and
self-certain identity.9 All truth is then established as true according to
the ultimate criterion of the subject’s self-certainty. The truths of the
human sciences are so thoroughly embedded in the idea of the thinking
subject’s self-certain grounding of truth that the questionability (in the
sense of being thought-worthy) of the practice of grounding itself
remains regrettably invisible to them. Thus, the longing for foundations
should never be interpreted as a mere “psychological content,” to be
explained by psychological mechanisms or even by the all-too-glib
anthropological hypothesis of a universal “need for meaning” that
precedes the construction of particular meanings. These modes of social
storytelling look away from the longing for foundations to the antecedent
conditions of its possibility, and thus unknowingly manifest the very

6
7
8
9

SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 19 (James Strachey trans., 1961).
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 40e (Peter Winch trans., 1984).
BENEDICT [BARUCH] DE SPINOZA, ETHICS 135 (James Gutmann ed., 1955).
1 RENÉ DESCARTES, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 127 (John Cottingham et al.
trans., 1985) (“I am thinking, therefore I exist”).
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longing they purport to explain without having clarified it in its own
phenomenality.
Traditional metaphysics evades the problem of the longing for
foundations by ossifying longing’s results in the form of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason. Leibniz was the first to make a rigorous formal
statement of this principle, which has nevertheless been a fundamental
presupposition of Western thought since antiquity.10 At the level of
ontology, Leibniz’s Latin expression of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason is nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit quam non sit (“nothing is
without a reason why it exists rather than does not exist”):11 this
represents the law that nothing is, in the sense of being an existing being,
unless there is a sufficient reason for why it is. In other words, every
being and event (B) must have its reason (A)—a reason that is not the
same as it is, but rather something that is different from it and yet a kind
of source or origin for it. At the level of language and logic, Leibniz
transformed the Principle of Reason into what he called the principium
reddendae rationis: the “principle of rendering reasons.”12 Under this
conception of the way humans relate to truth, men and women become
the beings who render reasons for their assertions: for every truth it
claims, the faculty of reason must be prepared to render a reason. A
philosophical anthropology wherein “A Y B” is taken to be the
metaphysically predetermined form of all thought and speech obviously
lacks much interest in questioning what lies before the laws of thought
and all particular accounts of ground and grounded.13 Traditional
metaphysics, like the scientific method that it underwrites, therefore
cannot give us any access to the phenomenon of longing for foundations
to support universal human rights.
What then is the nature of this phenomenon, and how can it be
grasped in a manner that is most befitting its nature? By way of a
preliminary answer to the “what” question, and in preparation for what is
to come, permit me to say, rather cryptically, that the longing for
foundations manifests itself ontologically within what I will call the
phenomenon of distress. Unlike Heidegger’s anxiety,14 which is anxious
about, and on account of, Dasein’s own being-in-the-world (and not
10
11

12
13
14

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 8-9 (Mary Morris trans., 1934).
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LOGIC 114 (Michael Heim trans.,
1984).
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE PRINCIPLE OF REASON 22-23 (Reginald Lilly trans., 1996).
EDMUND HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS 7, 13 (Dorion Cairns trans., 1988).
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 393 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 1962).
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anything in particular),15 distress is unmistakably other-regarding, and
hence is altruistically deflected away from the self’s concern for itself. It
is linked intimately and essentially to the phenomenon of ethical
responsibility that arises in the I’s relation with others. Indeed, ethical
responsibility and distress are locked together like the opposite poles of a
magnetic bar, forming a unitary phenomenon. Their mode of temporality
is the present in its ecstatic mode of standing outside itself towards the
future, unlike the past-oriented, and ultimately self-regarding, practices
of defending and justifying what the I has already done. Distress arises
on the hither side of a responsibility that threatens to overflow the
bounds of reason and become radical and all-encompassing. It manifests
the obsessive worry that, without foundations for a practice that ignores
universal suffering and even creates new suffering in the name of
ameliorating the old, finite human action would always bring with it an
infinite and self-contradictory responsibility that threatens the very
possibility of action.
As for the “how” question, I will say, likewise only
preliminarily, that phenomenological reflection can provide an initial
mode of access to the phenomena of distress and the longing for
foundations. I will therefore provide a phenomenological interpretation
of distress and longing. In the end, however, only a radicalized kind of
compassion can complete the task of understanding these phenomena.
As Heidegger remarks, a genuine journey of thought is always a new
beginning that commences in unclarified passion (from the Latin passus,
“having suffered”) on the basis of a kind of pre-possession of its object.16
Without passion, thought is content to calculate in the realm of what is
merely useful to attaining ends that remain unquestioned; and without
pre-possession in some manner, a problem cannot be encountered as a
problem in the first place. The task of a philosophical journey is to bring
thought’s passion to maturity and clarity, so that what is pre-possessed,
albeit unthematically, can be re-appropriated in the end in a more radical
and genuine way. With any luck, the unclarified passion of our thought
will, at the close of this essay’s journey, become the clarified compassion of suffering-with, and on account of, the suffering of those poor

15

16

In BEING AND TIME, Heidegger appropriated the German word for existence, Dasein, to refer to
the existential determination of the human being—its “howness.” Id. at 67. As he said later,
Dasein is simply a “title for the Being of man.” MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PLATO’S SOPHIST 256
(Richard Rojcewicz & André Schuwer trans., 1997).
HEIDEGGER, supra note 4, at 20.
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souls (myself included) who long to have foundations for what they do in
the arena of international human rights.

II. UNIVERSAL HUMAN SUFFERING
The word “suffering” comes from two Latin terms: sub (under)
and ferre (to bear). To be borne under by what bears upon one in the
course of existing is to suffer. It is no accident that the Buddha put the
truth of suffering at the very top of his famous list of the “Four Noble
Truths.”17 Whether by chance or design, all of us suffer because all of us
crave, and in craving we let the here-and-now become a disappointment
to us. In truth, we hardly ever get what we really want, and even when
do, we are left with new things to want or desire. Meanwhile, we feel the
lack of the wanted as if it were gnawing at us like a physical hunger.
Even our persistence in being, as Emmanuel Levinas says, can become a
source of torment, leading us to feel guilty for existing at all: “My ‘being
in the world’ or my ‘place in the sun,’ my home—are they not a
usurpation of places that belong to the other man who has already been
oppressed or starved by me?”18 Willie Loman’s suicide, in Death of a
Salesman, is preceded by his anguished calculation that the proceeds of
his life insurance are worth more to his family than he is: thus does art
warn thought that there are some forms of suffering that make
nonexistence look like a blessing.19
Please do not mistake the intention behind the previous
paragraph. These gloomy remarks about the ubiquity and strange
persistence of human suffering are offered not as a jeremiad, after the
fashion of Schopenhauer,20 but as a cri de coeur, after the fashion of
someone who reports, sincerely and in good faith, what he has seen and
17

The “noble truth of suffering” comes first, followed by three others: “the noble truth of the
origin of suffering,” “the noble truth of the cessation of suffering,” and “the noble truth of the way
leading to the cessation of suffering.” Saccavibhanga Sutta (The Exposition of the Truths), in
MAJJHIMA NIK YA (THE MIDDLE LENGTH DISCOURSES OF THE BUDDHA 1097-1101, at 1098
(Bhikkhu Ñ namoli & Bikkhu Bodhi, tr. 1995).
18
EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ON THINKING-OF-THE-OTHER: ENTRE NOUS 130 (Michael Smith &
Barbara Harshav trans., 1998).
19
ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN 125-26 (1949).
20
See, e.g., 1 ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION 253 (Eric
F.J. Payne trans., 1969) (“The unspeakable pain, the wretchedness and misery of mankind, the
triumph of wickedness, the scornful mastery of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just and
innocent are all here presented to us; and here is to be found a significant hint as to the nature of
the world and of existence.”).
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experienced in life, over and over again. Most people notice and are
moved by their own suffering first of all, and only thereafter do they pay
attention to the sufferings of others. Even then they tend to care only
about suffering that they believe to be unjust or unnecessary by some
normative criterion. Just and necessary suffering, if it is noticed at all,
appears in the guise of a natural occurrence, and it seems to assert no
greater claim on the conscience than do the deaths of the animals that we
eat, wear, and turn into exchange values. To be sure, altruists and saints
tend to cast the net of compassion farther than do egotists and sinners.
However far the net may be cast, though, it almost always falls
considerably short of the whole.
Fortunately, it remains possible for critical thought to go where
convention does not. In Walter Benjamin’s image of the “revolutionary
killing of the oppressor,”21 for instance, can be glimpsed an ordinarilyoverlooked feature of the problem of suffering. His image of selfrighteous slaughter reminds us that even the just and necessary deserts of
“bad” people are engines of suffering for someone. Consider the anguish
and privation of those “innocents” who love or otherwise care about the
punished one. Where is the justice in the tears of the parents, spouse,
and children of those who are justly repressed or destroyed? There is
also the intractable problem of those unfortunates who, caught in a web
of circumstantial evidence, delay, defensive inadequacy, or prosecutorial
excess, fall unfairly under the wheels of a judicial system that is
inevitably less than perfect. One might even say that convention counts
the suffering of both classes of innocents as unavoidable “collateral
damage” in the war that justice wages on injustice. As for the guilty, the
case could be made that the justly punished suffer more than the unjustly
punished for every increment of pain they endure. Martyrs can dilute
their torment by entertaining the sublime belief that justice will some day
be done on their account. But the just suffering of those who are guilty
of injustice remains, like the supposed pain of those in hell, completely
unmitigated by any prospect of a better justice to come.
The not-infrequent claims made against the Western idea of
human rights, primarily on account of its posing as both universal and
universally the possessions of individuals, reveal another aspect of the
problem of suffering. Certain uncomfortable questions arise. For
example, could it be that some forms of “human rights” are, at bottom,
simply new labels for the old phenomenon of Western cultural and
21

WALTER BENJAMIN, REFLECTIONS 298 (Peter Demetz ed. & Edmund Jephcott trans., 1978).
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political imperialism? Does the military and economic enforcement of
human rights norms by powerful states purporting to wear the mantle of
universal humanity betray a certain particularity of interest on account of
that enforcement’s shameless partiality and selectivity? Do human rights
norms that reflect the Enlightenment ethic of individualism ignore the
conflict between a constitutionalized individual right of selfdetermination and local conditions that may prefer social values over the
will of the individual? Should the negative conception of rights
contained in many human rights declarations (freedom from certain
forms of coercion) give way to a more positive conception of rights
(freedom to enjoy certain economic, social, or cultural entitlements)?
Should minority groups enjoy certain rights qua groups that are equal or
superior to the universal rights of individuals? Does the unprecedented
threat of terrorism to the many in the post-9/11 era permit a certain
relaxation of vigilance when it comes to protecting the human rights of
the alleged terrorist few? Given that political and economic resources
are limited, even in developed countries, why does the protection of
individual human rights devour so much of our attention, while so little
of it goes to remedy the many other pressing problems of humanity, such
as poverty, hunger, and disease? In asking these questions the suspicion
arises that not every person of good faith agrees that the gains of human
rights enforcement are always completely free from any offset on
account of social and cultural losses.
These questions should not be interpreted as an argument against
the vigorous enforcement of human rights norms, as if the questions are
secretly intended to make the case for more torture and oppression in the
world. This essay seeks to uncover a deeper level for thinking than the
level of a heated debate about “values.” Genuine thought enjoys the rare
privilege of questioning things in depth—a privilege that mere opinion
forfeits on account of the haste of its delivery and the defensiveness of its
stance. When Levinas uttered the shocking opinion that “[e]ven the S.S.
man has what I mean by [an ethical] face,”22 he meant to draw attention
to a realm of suffering that transcends the categories “just/unjust” and
“necessary/unnecessary.” The point is breathtakingly simple: the moral
imperative to mount a defense against evil (including the evil of certain
human rights abuses) does not imply that a successful defense causes no
pain. Nor is there any eternal balance wherein the weight of one man’s
agony and death is cancelled out by the happiness of thousands. “[R]eal
22

LEVINAS, supra note 17, at 231.
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history is woven out of a real suffering that is not lessened in proportion
to the growth of means for its abrogation,” say Horkheimer and
Adorno.23 This does not suggest that people’s lives cannot be
“improved,” at least according to certain conventional measures of
progress. Rather, to cancel all of mankind’s real suffering we would
literally have to waken the dead, as Benjamin puts it, and make whole
what history has irretrievably smashed.24 The sufferings and deaths of
innocent bystanders in times of a just struggle against evil are therefore
but the tip of an iceberg. Henceforth I will use the term “universal
human suffering” to indicate the suffering of a suffering humanity
considered without discrimination on account of any division that would
separate it into categories tending to comfort the heart or the mind.
Thus, the sufferings of the just and the unjust are both included in this
category, and sufferings thought to be necessary sit squarely alongside
those that are felt to be unnecessary.
This radicalized conception of universal human suffering puts
the theory of human rights in an awkward position. Aimed at ending
some of mankind’s worst outrages and brutalities, modern human rights
practices conceive of human beings as allegorical, moral persons—
formally co-equal citizens of the world. According to Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, both George W.
Bush and the lowliest peasant in the shabbiest village in the poorest
country on earth are “free and equal in dignity and rights,” even though
their real access to the wherewithal to achieve and maintain their dignity
and rights is radically unequal.25 As this example begins to suggest,
human rights cannot declare war on suffering as such—universal
suffering, that is—without attending to what Marx calls “authentic man
. . . man in his sensuous, individual and immediate existence.”26 Yet the
minute they begin to notice the plenitude of real sufferings experienced
by men and women conceived as concrete social beings, liberal human
rights practices have to worry about becoming a self-defeating tyranny.
As Levinas puts it: If the requirements of the Rights of Man extend
across the entire field of life-in-the-world—if they go so far as to
guarantee “‘weekends’ and ‘paid vacations,’” not to mention “the right to
23

Max Horkheimer & Theodor Adorno, The Concept of Enlightenment, in THE CONTINENTAL
PHILOSOPHY READER, supra note 1, at 199, 210.
WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS 257 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1968).
25
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), in EDWARD LAWSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 1655, 1656 (1991).
26
KARL MARX, EARLY WRITINGS 30 (T.B. Bottomore ed. & trans., 1964).
24
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well-being and the beautiful, that makes life bearable”—then “the
validity of that charter would continually clash with what we may call
the mechanical necessities of the social reality known to the positive
sciences, which are mainly attentive to causal laws.”27
In other words, mainstream thinking imagines that to devote “too
much” in resources to helping the poor and downtrodden is to threaten
the health of the socio-economic goose that lays the golden egg of
material progress for everyone. It is little wonder that the many
economic and cultural rights guaranteed in Articles 22 through 27 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are so seldom honored and
enforced.28 Conservative social science is always eager to remind liberal
humanism about the law of unintended consequences, which suggests
that well-meant measures to reduce present suffering can actually
increase future suffering owing to the perverse incentives created by the
reversals of fortune they enact. Nor can the tender of heart fail to notice
a rather dismal lesson that is taught by the history of revolutions during
the past two centuries: namely, that the “logic of the oppressed
goodwill,” as Julia Kristeva puts it,29 so often kindles the kind of anger
that leads to massacres. History teaches us to suspect optimists. For as
Sorel says, it always seems to be the optimist, driven mad by the
unforeseen obstacles that his projects encounter, who dreams of bringing
about the happiness of future generations by slaughtering existing
egoists.30
Thus it is that mainstream human rights law is always on guard
lest it go “too far” in the direction of disturbing the present equilibrium
of forces. It always seeks to strike a more-or-less Hobbesian “wise
balance” between state power seen as a threat to human flourishing and
state power seen as a condition of that flourishing. In practice, this
balance allows any state that honors basic human rights norms to be
ideologically cleansed of the taint of illegitimacy in its use of necessary
force within its proper sphere. The law of property—which, as Proudhon
states, has so often been used to grind people down through the
privileges to exclude and dominate that it bestows on private property

27
28
29

30

EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ALTERITY AND TRANSCENDENCE 146-47 (Michael Smith trans., 1999).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), supra note 25, at 1656.
Julia Kristeva, Women’s Time, in THE CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY READER, supra note 1, at
380, 393.
GEORGES SOREL, REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE 11 (Jeremy Jennings ed., Thomas Hulme &
Jeremy Jennings trans., 1999).
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owners31—is never seen as a human rights violation, at least so long as
the police and the courts exercise suitable restraint in the way they
enforce the rights of property owners. On the contrary, property rights
and the right to an effective remedy for their violation are written into the
Universal Declaration (Articles 8 and 17) as fundamental human rights.32
Indeed, they sit alongside other rights, like freedom of movement
(Article 13) and the right to life, liberty, and security of person (Article
3), that can contradict them in practice.33 Human rights institutions
generally leave to state power the task of working out the subtle relations
between property rights and human dignity. Moreover, as a matter of
principle, they must leave to state power the job of line-drawing within
the vast sphere of social interaction that human rights norms leave
completely untouched. International human rights practices thus work
hand in hand with positive and natural law at the local level to allocate
and redistribute pain within a sphere of universal human suffering that
always remains invisible to them.
For positive law, the task of dividing suffering into the just and
the unjust, or the necessary and the unnecessary, belongs to politics and
its primary instrument, law; in contrast, natural law sees this task as
already having been accomplished by God or nature. Despite their
differences, however, positive law and natural law are united in the way
they conceive the appropriate stopping point for reason and
responsibility: Reason’s labors are ended, and with them all social and
individual responsibility, once the lines of division between the just and
the unjust, the necessary and the unnecessary, are drawn or ascertained.
Thereafter just and necessary suffering, if it is seen at all, is thought to be
for the individual to manage in the best way he can. Redemption,
atonement, and stoic acceptance are the possible fruits of a lonely project
undertaken by the justly suffering individual on the basis of religion,
good works, and philosophy. The righteous others—at a minimum, the
powerful ones who have drawn or found the line on the other side of
which the justly suffering stand—wash their hands of the matter once
justice is done. Social thought thus ends where just and necessary
suffering begins, so much so that those rare thinkers who explicitly think
the realm of violence and suffering in its entirety, like Sorel and

31

32
33

PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 16 (Donald Kelley & Bonnie Smith ed. &
trans., 1994).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), supra note 25, at 1656.
Id.
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Benjamin,34 are barely understood at all when they speak. Nevertheless,
the thinking in this essay will not play the role of Pontius Pilate to those
whom history has condemned or forgotten. Like Benjamin’s “angel of
history,” we will wonder at, and lament, the spectacle of the wreckage
upon wreckage that history continues to throw at our feet.35 In short, we
will seek out the innermost relation between our human rights practices
and the vast ocean of human suffering in its entirety.
III. UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WILL TO POWER
The concept of universal human rights, a child of the
Enlightenment, is conventionally taken to signify that. certain minimum
entitlements belong to individual human beings solely by virtue of the
fact that they are human. Such entitlements, once their appropriate
expression is determined, are thought to be unaffected by all accidents of
status and nationality. Whether American or Iraqi, man or woman,
Muslim or Jew, all people begin life equally endowed with fundamental
human rights, at least according to the usual interpretation. On this view,
human rights become what ought to be respected by those who owe their
bearers a duty of respect (the officials of nation-states, by most
definitions), and what ought to be meaningfully enforced by institutions,
local or international, in the event they are violated. In the international
movement to expand the vigor, reach, and scope of human rights
enforcement—the trial of Slobodan Milosevic by the International War
Crimes Tribunal is a good example—one can detect the emergence of a
certain will to power, even if it is only a power that runs counter to
certain exercises of power by the state. What Pascal says about people’s
attitude towards justice—”Justice without might is helpless. . . . We must
then combine justice and might, and for this end make what is just
strong, or what is strong just”36—also seems an apt description of the
34
35

36

SOREL, supra note 28, at 10-12; BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 277-300.
Eyes staring, mouth open, and wings spread, the angel’s face is “turned toward the past,”
Benjamin says. BENJAMIN, supra note 23, at 259. The description continues: “Where we
perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon
wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and
make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in
his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly
propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows
skyward. This storm is what we call progress.” Id. at 257-58.
BLAISE PASCAL, PENSÉES AND THE PROVINCIAL LETTERS 103 (W.F. Trotter & Thomas M’Crie
trans., 1941).
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usual stance towards universal human rights. In a nutshell: rights on
paper are useless without the ability to marshal enough force to back
them up in practice. The will to power (in the Nietzschean sense) that is
increasingly displayed in the arena of international human rights
enforcement represents no less than a frontal assault on the monopoly of
the use of legitimate force that nation-states have enjoyed vis-à-vis their
citizens ever since the first emergence of nation-states in the sixteenth
century.
As a metaphysical determination of the manner in which human
beings exist in time, the will to power feeds on resistance, and its
voracious movements to enhance itself against resistance are ever and
always for itself.37 For people who desperately seek to defend
themselves against the illegitimate claims of legitimate power, or who
seek to overcome that power’s abuse by means of a counterattack, it is
enough that the concept of universal human rights is accepted by people
in a position to help them. The mere custom of respecting and enforcing
human rights, if it is sufficiently widespread and institutionalized,
constitutes a reservoir of counter-power that can be interposed against
the power of those officials who would cause (or have caused) certain
forms of suffering. A drowning man will grasp at any straw that happens
to float by. So too the oppressed will be glad to agree with Pascal that
custom is the source of all right,38 if only there actually exist institutions
whose custom it is to relieve their kind of oppression on the ground that
it is a human rights violation. For the truly desperate and their
advocates, the concept of human rights is a weapon that, like all such
instruments, is located first and foremost in the sphere of the merely
useful, which is to say the sphere of history and its causal forces. As a
weapon, human rights practices are “lawmaking violence,” as Benjamin
puts it.39 Claiming to represent a universal humanity in the persons of
those who enforce human rights, they stand alongside all other such
claims made in the course of history. For when history delivers a sword
to human rights practices they enter the sphere of positive law, which is
none other than law posited by the sword. Thereafter, if it is at all
conscious of its roots, the “legitimate” practice of human rights
enforcement will seek to represent and preserve the order “imposed by

37

38
39

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 261-453 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale
trans., 1968).
PASCAL, supra note 34, at 101.
BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 295.
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fate,” as Benjamin puts it,40 for it is the wheel of fate that has finally put
human rights in a respected institutional position. Those who attack
particular laws in the name of justice never attack law’s authority, for
they always wish to appropriate a share of that very authority for their
own ends. So it is with the phenomenon of universal human rights
enforcement, if it is seen as a mere manifestation of will to power.
One could say, however, that the concept of will to power has an
“image problem.” It comes across as such a brutal and disillusioning
idea. Will to power seems to draw no distinction between “destroying a
village to make it free,” as some American military officers used to say
during the war in Vietnam, and putting war criminals on trial for their
acts of genocide. In their less desperately instrumental hours, therefore,
supporters of universal human rights long for an account that grounds
their practice in a manner that yields an undoubtedly secure foundation
instead of a contingent series of causes and effects. That the actual
creation and enforcement of human rights are subject to causal forces is
insufficiently reassuring to reason, for history’s march is erratic. History
is notorious for randomly delivering perplexing admixtures of happiness
and sorrow, and those islands of human rights protection that exist today
could easily decline into barbarism tomorrow, thus leaving the age of
human rights behind like the age of the dinosaurs. A mere prediction
that human rights will be honored in fact always rests on the shifting
sands of a guess and never on the bedrock of what the scholastics used to
call a fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum. Reason yearns not for a
probabilistic causal account of human rights, but for an account that
portrays them as logically and morally necessary consequences of their
absolute and unshakable ground. For it is felt that ground and grounded
will endure whole and undisturbed in the pure realm of Truth regardless
of what happens to them here on earth: Even if history does happen to
ignore them in a moment of crisis or forgetfulness, so far as the theory of
human rights is concerned the unity that is ground-and-grounded always
lies ready to be rediscovered by the exercise of right reason.
Without the feeling of justification that comes from belief in a
secure foundation, the use of human rights as a weapon would seem to
fall into the same category as calculated human rights violations: both
would show themselves as mere instruments of war in a ceaseless and
ultimately meaningless series of historical struggles between peoples.
Reason thus searches for a foundation on which its movements may rest
40

Id. at 285.
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securely and in good conscience. The tripartite form of this movement is
A Y B, where A is the foundation and origin of a movement, symbolized
by Y, to the action or outcome that is B. In the syntax of enjoying or
claiming universal human rights, this movement is usually described in
terms of certain foundational texts—the Déclaration des droits de
l’homme et du citoyen, to name a notable one from history41—that “give”
people some bundle of rights, privileges, or immunities.
If human rights are denied or violated, the origin remains the
same, but the grammatical direction changes. Beginning from the human
rights text as foundation, thought and action move to the sphere of
corrective justice, wherein those who deny human rights are forced to
uphold them and those who have violated human rights are punished or
forced to make amends. The foundation of human rights, conceived by
modernism in terms of the constant presence of that-which-grounds, is
ultimately Kantian. It is seen to stand within human affairs as a
universally present prohibition and warrant, as if general textual
references like “human dignity” had pre-wired their correct and
necessary applications to every particular circumstance into the faculty
of judgment of every reasonable subject. Alternatively, postmodern
thought can seek to discover what Douzinas and Warrington call the
“ethical non-foundational foundation of the law”—one that would
relocate the foundation of human rights from the abstract sphere of
malleable texts to the concrete sphere of “new forms of living.”42 This
kind of reaction against modernism’s textual formalism does not let go of
the craving for foundations, however, for it imagines that certain ethical
attitudes and ways of being (A) can ultimately lead to a kind of justice
(B) that does not miscarry. The postmodern aspiration for a better justice
to come on the basis of a better way of behaving in the now thus reinscribes the movement A Y B without ever saying so explicitly.
We have, however, already spent enough time investigating the
ideological nature of foundation-laying as such, for we seek what lies
before ideology and before any particular foundation. Prior to reason’s
search for a foundation that would satisfy the criterion A Y B is a
phenomenon that sets the search in motion. As we shall see, this original

41

42

A notable achievement of the French Revolution, the original text of the Déclaration des droits
de l’Homme et du citoyen 26 août 1789 can be found at Minestère de la Justice, Les Droits de
l’Homme, http://www.justice.gouv.fr/textfond/ddhc.htm (last visited May 30, 2006): .
COSTAS DOUZINAS & RONNIE WARRINGTON, JUSTICE MISCARRIED: ETHICS, AESTHETICS AND
THE LAW 309 (1994).
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and originating phenomenon consists of two “moments” held together in
tension: ethical responsibility and distress.

IV. INFINITE ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY AND AN INITIAL INDICATION
OF DISTRESS
To Emmanuel Levinas belongs the high praise of having made
what is one of the most important discoveries in phenomenology during
the past century. Levinas exhibits, as ethics, a phenomenon of care for
the other person that surpasses being—that is “otherwise than being” in a
manner that is even more radical than Plato’s epekeina t s ousias.43 The
latter, in Book VI of the Republic, determines “the good” as that which
“transcends [ousias (being), translated insipidly as “essence”] in dignity
and surpassing power.”44 Plato’s idea of the good can (but need not) be
sought by the mind, however, whereas Levinas’s phenomenological
research finds in the face of the other person a haunting opacity that at
once excludes the light of knowledge and kindles the heat of a radically
asymmetrical responsibility—a debt of hospitality and generosity that is
due without any prior loan or trespass.
In facing the Other, the I encounters another being behind whose
face lurks the mystery of a freedom like its own. The temptation to kill
this Other confronts a “Thou shalt not kill” written in the heart before it
was ever written on a tablet. In the realm of facing begins a
responsibility that Levinas discovers, using the phenomenological
method, to be “prior to deliberation and to which I was . . . exposed and
dedicated before being dedicated to myself.”45 Levinas’s other person is
not a knowable something, but neither is it an unknowable nothing: this
Other
transcends
the
categories
“being/non-being”
and
“known/unknown,” and its face marks the site of the I’s encounter with
an otherness that is absolute. Levinas’s notion of responsibility is not
reducible to a universal animal instinct of man, but comes into view
somewhere between observation and aspiration. It finds its confirmation
(and its hope) in the countless small acts of kindness that are exchanged
daily between neighbors—each one a “‘small goodness’ from one person
43

44

45

EMMANUEL LEVINAS, BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 114-15 (Adriaan T. Peperzak, et al.
eds., 1996).
Plato, The Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 575, 744 (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns ed., Paul Shorey trans., 1961).
LEVINAS, supra note 17, at 170.
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to his fellowman that is lost and deformed as soon as it seeks
organization and universality and system.”46 Ethical responsibility born
of the everyday sociality of the face-to-face encounter is the primordial
datum in Levinas’s thought: it precedes all egoism, all rational
calculation, all thought, and all affective states. Like all genuine
phenomenological findings, ethical responsibility offers and constitutes
its own evidence, and it requires no “argument” to establish itself. The
world’s more-than-ample historical record of murders, frauds,
oppressions, and outrages is therefore not properly conceived of as
“counter-evidence.” Rather, these modes of being show themselves as
privations of a phenomenon that always precedes them in daily life. The
universal phenomenon of individual conscience shows that the impulse
to harm the Other generally requires work in order to overcome a prior
sense of ethical responsibility, thus betraying the unethical’s status as a
derivative and secondary phenomenon.
The Other whose face the I encounters in responsibility has
always been there, and he lets the I be an I for the first time. This lettingthe-I-be-itself is not to be understood, in Hegelian terms, as the process
whereby the subject first knows itself as itself by putting itself into
opposition to what it is not. A mere identity that is known by means of
difference is not the same as the phenomenon of individuation that is
discovered through ethical responsibility for the Other. As Levinas says,
“The Other individuates me in my responsibility for him. The death of
the Other affects me in my very identity as a responsible I.”47 The
phenomenal irrationality of the ubiquitous small kindnesses that pass
between strangers, before reason has “explained” them by reducing them
to calculations based on short- or long-term reciprocity, signifies that
economic rationality is a secondary phenomenon. Even speech, the very
means and expression of reason, is not ultimately explicable by reason.
In the encounter between Same and Other, the quintessential form of
which is speech, the “sovereign I”—so proud of its accomplishments and
knowledge—speaks to the Other in a saying that is irreducible to any
said. The messiness of speaking with another is confirmed by the
surprise of the unanticipated cues that he gives us, and the uneasiness
and suspense we feel in finishing what we have to say, only to hear the
Other respond to us in his own idiom. Speech upsets the I’s
complacency and discomfits its sense of self-sufficiency and control. In
46
47

Id. at 230.
EMMANUEL LEVINAS, DIEU, LA MORT ET LE TEMPS 199 (1993).
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speaking to the Other, the I is concerned to reach the Other before trying
to know him. Even if the I has decided to speak to the Other in order to
get something from him, the I’s motive recedes in the moment of
speaking itself: it explains the approach, but does not adequately describe
the consummation.
The ethical is not properly described in terms of a discrete
relation between two separate beings that first encounter one another and
then rationally calculate what rights they possess and what duties they
owe. “Knowledge is a relation of the Same with the Other in which the
Other is reduced to the Same and divested of its strangeness,” writes
Levinas.48 But what Levinas discovers in the face-to-face ethical
encounter as such is unencumbered by the co-emergence of any ego, self,
or subject who could conquer the Other’s strangeness by knowing it and
bringing it back into consciousness in the form of an adequate
representation. Hence Levinas will repeatedly characterize the moment
of the ethical encounter as such in terms of transcendence: the I goes out
of itself in care towards the Other, but does not return to itself with the
image of the Other subdued, as it were, in the form of knowledge.
Transcendence thus formally indicates a phenomenological category that
Levinas characterizes as “the fact of human fellowship, prior to
freedom.”49 Among other things, fellowship means that humans are
always social beings before they are “individuals,” or rather, that
individuation without prior birth into a world of meaningful social
interaction is unthinkable; one might even go so far as to say that
Levinas’s notion of “responsibility” is but another name for this
primordial truth of philosophical anthropology.
The phenomenon of human fellowship, and the ethical
responsibility that is its meaning, are visible in the relation between the I
and exactly one Other. The Other most proximite to the I at any given
moment is not the only one in the I’s world, however. Along can
come—indeed, sooner or later there always comes—a third person to
disturb the original intimacy of the ethical relation between Self and
Other. This third person disturbs and threatens the original ethical
relation because he is “another other” who has just as great a claim on
the I’s ethical responsibility as the first Other:
[T]he third person is himself also a neighbor, and also falls within the
purview of the I’s responsibility. Here, beginning with this third

48
49

LEVINAS, supra note 41, at 151.
Id. at 91.
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person, is the proximity of a human plurality. Who, in this plurality,
comes first? This is the time and place of the birth of the question: of
a demand for justice! This is the obligation to compare unique and
incomparable others; this is the moment of knowledge and,
henceforth, of an objectivity beyond or on the hither side of the
nakedness of the face; this is the moment of consciousness and
intentionality.50

“The third man (or person)” in Levinas’s writings represents an
entire society of others, any one of whom could be the I’s Other in the
face-to-face encounter of ethics. Since Levinas wants to conceive of
sociality as independent of the “‘lost’ unity” represented by being as a
whole,51 these other Others are not conceived collectively, but as
singularities that are just as unique, ineffable, and needy as the original
ethical Other. Injustice is annulled by forgiveness within the circle of the
ethical relation, but it demands redress when the ethical situation is
ruptured by the entrance of the third person. “Hence,” Levinas says, “it
is important to me to know which of the two takes precedence.”52 In any
conflict between two or more Others in which the I is involved, Levinas
claims, “all the excess of generosity that I must have toward the [first]
Other is subordinated to a question of justice.”53
In subordinating the generosity that originally characterizes the
ethical impulse, however necessary this may be for justice, a certain
darkness eclipses universal suffering, as if the I needed a deep shadow to
fall on the consequences of its actions. Because Levinas stops short of
giving a rigorous phenomenological description of the moment of justice
as such, he fails to address the connection between responsibility and
distress, and hence he fails to see that this distress is connected
essentially to the phenomenon of longing for a secure foundation to
support the enforcement of human rights.

V. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF DISTRESS ON
ACCOUNT OF RESPONSIBILITY
If Levinas is credited with having discovered, through
phenomenological reflection, a pre-gnostic and pre-original phenomenon

50
51
52
53

LEVINAS, supra note 17, at 166-67.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 104.
LEVINAS, supra note 25, at 102.
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of care for the Other, he may be excused for overlooking a phenomenon
that is co-original with the ethical responsibility that is that care’s formal
indication. By means of the suspension (epoché) of the natural attitude
that is required for all rigorous phenomenological research, it is possible
to detect, in the moment of care for the Other, the co-emergence of a
different yet connected phenomenon—one that I will call distress. What
phenomena require of thought, as Heidegger states, “is only to see and
accept them as they show themselves.”54 The point of this essay's
phenomenological research is to elucidate distress as a phenomenon, and
not to draw any hasty conclusions from it. To be sure, Levinas himself
was aware of the phenomenon of distress, albeit in a vague and general
sort of way. In the essay Peace and Proximity, for example, he describes
(or prescribes) an “anxiety of responsibility that is incumbent on
everyone in the death or suffering of the other,” and he writes of this
anxiety in terms of the ethical I’s being “troubled at the prospect of
committing violence—albeit necessary for the logical unfolding of
history . . . [and] the march of truth.”55 But nowhere does Levinas make
distress on account of responsibility into a theme that is suitable for
phenomenological interpretation.
Taking “life” as a fundamental phenomenological category,56 one
must first clarify and delimit that particular region of life wherein the
twin phenomena of distress and the longing for foundations for human
rights show themselves. It bears noting that this region is not the
adversarial moment of fighting for the human rights of this or that person
or group, for as we have seen already, this moment is completely filled
up with the burning concern that the thrusts and parries of human rights
strategies and discourse will be causally effective. Nor is this region to
be found in that rather common (if not ubiquitous) mode of being
wherein one unreflectively “drifts along,” content to accept and reiterate
unthinkingly what “they” say about the content and nature of foundations
for human rights. If we stay rigorously within the moment of longing as
such, those who long for foundations dwell outside the comfortable zone
of indifference to any questioning or understanding that might hamper
their action or enjoyment. In the region of life that we seek, the I holds
54
55
56

MARTIN HEIDEGGER, ZOLLIKON SEMINARS 62 (Franz Mayr & Richard Askay trans., 2001).
LEVINAS, supra note 41, at 164.
HEIDEGGER, supra note 4, at 61. The category “life” in this early Heideggerian text reveals the
influence of Dilthey on Heidegger’s early thought; nevertheless, nothing of importance depends
here on whether we use this category or Heidegger’s later category of Dasein as the point of
departure for our reflections on the phenomenon of distress.
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itself at a distance from the fray of particular human rights struggles, and
it draws back, even if only momentarily, from the leveled-down
discourse of everyday talk about why the protection of human rights is a
“good thing to do.”
Sorel’s remark that “philosophy is only a recognition of the
abysses which lie on each side of the path that the vulgar follow with the
serenity of sleepwalkers” gives an initial formal indication of the region
sought here.57 The usual disposition of life is to encounter and be
occupied with what is nearest to hand in its care. Care need not, and
usually is not, explicit as care to a thematizing consciousness. It is a
fundamental phenomenological category, first discovered by Heidegger,
and it indicates formally that life is always concerned with or about
something or other.58 Even in boredom, which is best characterized as a
privation of care about anything in particular, care finds itself filled up
with some matter to be concerned about: namely, the uncomfortable fact
that it is bored. In the region of human rights practice to be delimited
here, care encounters an Other towards whom it feels an ethical pull: as
the previous exposition of Levinas’s thought has shown, the I’s care
upsurges towards this original Other in the form of responsibility. Copresent in this encounter, however, is distress on account of this very
responsibility, owing to the presence of other Others who will or may be
affected by the I’s responsible actions. Distress, which is itself a form of
suffering, is a kind of making-present of the actual and possible suffering
of others. In distress (from the Latin dis- and strangere, “to bind tight”)
the Other and other Others are bound tightly together in a care that stands
immobilized before a decision. The impending decision (from the Latin
de- and caedere, “to cut off”) is distressful because it will sunder care
into a living portion and a dead remainder, cutting its superabundance of
generosity in two. These two phenomena—responsibility and distress—
are equiprimordial in the I’s encounter with the Other in the region of life
with which we are concerned, and any thought aspiring to uncover the
phenomenal relation between ethics and justice must take care to account
for both.
This region of life can be called the moment of justice. This
moment is characterized by the more-or-less conscious awareness of an
impending decision within the context of a care that remains otherdirected at all times. Here the “decision” is not to be grasped
57
58

SOREL, supra note 28, at 7.
See HEIDEGGER, supra note 14, at 225-73.
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anthropologically, as a “free choice of man,” but ontologically, as a
fateful cutting-off of possibilities. Distress is therefore distressed in the
face of an un-decided that will in all events be decided, for in distress the
I is caught in the maelstrom of a care that renders the comfortable stance
of indifference impossible. The decision must (and will) decide between
the original Other, to whom the I is ethically indebted, and other Others,
to whom the I is also ethically indebted. For Levinas the moment of
justice is filled up with trying to know which Other takes precedence, and
the procedures and immanence of the knowledge that is required to effect
justice give affront to the uniqueness of both Others by making them into
abstractions, or, as Levinas puts it, by leaving them “de-faced [dévisagés].”59 However, since Levinas does not identify the phenomenon
of distress that precedes the de-facing and violence of justice, he is
unable to assess the meaning of this phenomenon, or its significance for
his project. Levinas yearns to perfect justice against its own harshness
by taking the quest for justice back to its source, “my obligation to other
men.”60 “Ultimately it is a question of founding the justice that offends
the face on the obligation with respect to the face,” he writes.61 But if, in
the moment of justice, distress arises equiprimordially with ethical
responsibility itself—if the two are locked together in such a way that the
longing for foundations is an inevitable modification of them—then
Levinas’s project is a chimera. For then the “obligation with respect to
the face” would mean that distress will always seek escape from the
torment of a decision between Others by means of a collapse into
foundationalism.
However, in order to grasp the true nature of this collapse it is
first necessary to delimit the phenomenological meaning of “distress”
with greater care. In particular, it must be stressed that although distress
is always on account of something, this phenomenon should not be
conceived as a psychological “feeling” that arises within a human being
whose being and essence have been otherwise determined. For a long
time psychology has limited distress to a “condition” that is caused by
such “mechanisms” as cognitive dissonance, and that can (and perhaps
should be) subjected to therapeutic transformations.62 Ontic psychology
considers and construes the psycho-physical only.63 Attuned to life in a
59

LEVINAS, supra note 25, at 170.
Id. at 170.
61
Id. at 103.
62
See HEIDEGGER, supra note 54, at 199.
63
Id.
60
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world that is itself taken for granted, it does not investigate what appears
as the world.64 In its existential signification, therefore, distress shakes
off all purely psycho-physical references and takes on the raiment of a
genuine foreboding. This foreboding is one of the very determinations of
being human in the moment of justice, and never merely a “symptom.”
It is an existential comportment: a Heideggerian Mir-Sein (“Being-tome”) of distress on account of others that may or may not be explicitly
present to cognition.65
Distress should never be confused with what I will call fear. In
fear the fearing one fears for itself. To be sure, in the moment of justice
there may also arise fear that the suffering Other’s voracious needs will
make too great an ethical demand on the I, even to the point of
exhausting or destroying it. It would be a mistake to underestimate the
fear that the I feels in the presence of the Other when it lapses from
ethical responsibility into the mode of caring for what Heidegger calls
“the ‘myself,’ for which I care.”66 The phenomenon of fear undoubtedly
gives evidence for Sartre’s famous epigram, “Hell is—other people!”67
Whether or not fear for the self emerges in the moment of justice,
however, it is not what I mean by the phenomenon of distress. If fear is
the phenomenological basis of the truth of egoism, and ethical
responsibility is the phenomenological basis of the truth of altruism, then
it must be said that distress yields a truth that stands outside—and
bestraddles—the age-old opposition between these two points of view.
Distress announces itself before action in the urgency of that
searing question we sometimes ask ourselves, “Am I doing the right
thing?” It is illustrated by the anguish of Jacob in Genesis 32, who,
when told that his brother Esau was marching to meet him at the head of
four hundred men, is described in verse 8 (verse 7 in the Christian Bible)
as being “greatly afraid and anguished.” According to the great tenthcentury rabbinical commentator Rashi, Jacob was afraid for his own
death, but he was also anguished at the possibility of having to kill.68
64

65
66
67

68

Id. at 281 (noting that to someone for whom the "true world" has been reduced to scientific
objects, the paired phenomena of worldliness (Welthafte) and worldlessness (Weltlosigkeit) "can
be shown as little as color [can be shown] to the color-blind"). See also EDMUND HUSSERL, THE
CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY 211-13 (David Carr,
tr. 1970) (tracing "the failure of psychology" to its "dualistic and physicalistic presuppositions").
HEIDEGGER, supra note 4, at 103.
Id. at 71.
JEAN PAUL SARTRE, HUIS-CLOS [NO EXIT] 47 (Stuart Gilbert trans., Vintage Books, 1949)
(1946).
LEVINAS, supra note 25, at 135.
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Anguish here is for the Other, or rather, for Jacob’s complicity in the
Other’s fate. According to Jewish tradition, the Decalogue’s command
“Thou shalt not kill,” though absolute in form, does not bear a message
of truth that is absolute enough to condemn killing in self-defense. Yet
there is always the chance that a killing believed to be in self-defense
will be interpreted as an aggression, and hence an affront to the Law.
The chance of this interpretation-to-come means that “[n]o judgment of
the deed can be derived from the commandment,” as Benjamin puts it,
“and so neither the divine judgment, nor the grounds for this judgment,
can be known in advance.”69 Jacob’s anguish is a perfect symbol of the
phenomena of distress and longing—phenomena that know their bearer
is about to overbear others and cause them to suffer or die, and that seek
a sign that what the I is about to do is justified by an authority outside of
itself.
Distress shows itself as co-present whenever the I’s ethical
responsibility for the Other involves other Others. Distress is not yet a
value orientation: it is not yet the posing of the question of which of
these two (or more) Others is “most worthy” of the I’s intervention, a
question that is to be decided according to some calculus of worthiness
“known” to the I. Value-thinking thinks after distress has surfaced, and
transforms the latter into the procedures of justice that are the concrete
consequences of distress and longing.
Whereas distress, like
responsibility itself, is pre-gnostic, and shows itself in the form of
uneasiness or anxiety on account of the I’s responsibility being pulled in
opposite directions. In the moment of justice the I’s sense of
responsibility undergoes a kind of rupture. In the mode of caring for
others, the I now encounters both an anxious Other for whom it feels the
ethical pull of a responsibility to do something to help, and more-or-less
concrete other Others who will or may also suffer on account of the I’s
very act of intervening in the situation. In a previous section I have
already identified some of these other Others, including those whom
reason will subsequently call “collateral damage,” as well as alleged
human rights violators themselves. Ethical responsibility to these other
Others presses upon the I’s responsibility to the original Other. Other
others confront responsibility with spectral images of, or vague stirrings
of foreboding on account of, what reason will later call “just” or
“necessary” suffering. The direction of the I’s care thus splits, and it is
as if caring came up against itself arriving as an enemy from the opposite
69

BENJAMIN, supra note 20, at 298.
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direction. The body of universal suffering slips in and threatens to cut
short the hyperbole of responsibility that the I feels for the original
Other. In the phenomenon of distress the Same does not return to itself,
as in knowledge and fear, but rather remains transcendent, outside itself
in a care that has lost its way among many suffering Others.
Nothing is to be gained from trying to decide which is more
original, responsibility or distress, for what shows itself in the temporal
moment of justice as such is not a sequence. Responsibility and distress
arise together in the moment of justice, united in the form of a field of
forces, as it were, that makes the I pause in doubt before acting in a
world swarming with many suffering Others.
Neither ethical
responsibility nor distress should be conceived as something detached
and rigidly autonomous from the concrete mode of temporality that is the
moment of justice. Distress and responsibility abide together in a
synthesis with its own peculiar form of intentionality: the cogitatum of
this synthesis is neither this Other nor the other Other, but the emptiness
of a freedom that confronts the decision between them.
Distress and responsibility, taken together in their synthesis,
“mean” a freedom that is always concretely empty of all content.
Although this freedom stands on the hither side of the temporal present
in the form of its “possibilities,” it remains powerless to avoid what
springs forth in the present as it seizes one possibility to the exclusion of
others. In the moment of justice, freedom as origin folds back on itself in
the form of motive, as if freedom were but a flickering shadow cast by
the decision just before it arrives. In having a motive the I loses its
freedom to a ground that it understands and follows so completely that it
becomes its motive. Prior to motive, yet always finding itself eclipsed by
its deeds, freedom becomes what Heidegger calls “the ground of
ground”: a gaping “abyss of ground” whose destiny it is to be constantly
filled-up by the present whatever it does.70 “You can do what you will,”
writes Schopenhauer, “but at any given moment of your life you can will
only one definite thing and absolutely nothing else but this one thing.”71
The intuition of responsibility that Levinas finds in the phenomenon of
the two-person ethical relation would become a kind of mechanistic
compulsion were it not for the evidence given by the phenomenon of
distress. This phenomenon thus makes comprehensible Heidegger’s idea
70

71

MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PATHMARKS 134 (William McNeill ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998)
(1967).
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, PRIZE ESSAY ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL 21 (Eric F.J. Payne
trans., 1999).
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that life is its possibilities.72 For even if distress offers no solution to
life’s dilemmas, at least it confirms that they are dilemmas.
The longing for foundations is a modification of responsibility
and distress. It is a flight from freedom, taken not merely in the sense of
the capacity to exercise and resist power, but in the far deeper sense of
what Barthes calls the “capacity to subjugate no one.”73 For the moment
of any justice that is effective is always a moment of someone’s
subjugation! This is what Foucault meant when he said, inverting
Clausewitz’s famous epigram, that “politics is the continuation of war by
other means.”74 In founding its own acts of justice in the sphere of
human rights the I lets that which is attached to it already—namely that
in which it is imprisoned as what “they” expect—run its course. What
“they” want (and expect) is the violence of state force—whether in the
form of legal remedies or humanitarian military interventions—in the
service of what convention calls justice. Freedom recedes so that the
“correctness of derivation and of fitting into an established . . . order”
may hold sway.75 The decision becomes decided, as if the I had nothing
to do with it. All descriptions of what the I has done begin to adopt the
passive voice: the oppressor and those who comfort him are imprisoned
or executed; the “shock and awe” of military force is unleashed.
Thereafter reason comforts itself by the undeniably correct
“psychological” argument that compassion for universal suffering must
be suffocated so that compassion for particular sufferings may breathe.
“All necessity is rooted in distress,” writes Heidegger.76 The
longing for foundations is the anterior portion of a movement into
collapse—into what Heidegger calls die Ruinanz (from the Latin ruo,
“collapse”).77 In collapse life forms itself out of the movements it makes
within the comfort of a dream world in which A Y B seems more real
than do A and B themselves, taken in their own right as phenomena.
Collapse collapses onto what is said to be the “basis” of this or that
movement, but what in fact shows itself phenomenally as “the
nothingness of factical life”: the empty, the foundationless abyss of a
72
73

74

75

76
77

HEIDEGGER, supra note 4, at 64.
Roland Barthes, Inaugural Lecture at the Collège de France, 7 January 1977, in THE
CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY READER, supra note 1, at 364, 366.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED” 15 (David Macey trans., Picador Books
2003) (1997).
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY (FROM ENOWNING) 46 (Parvis Emad &
Kenneth Maly trans., Ind. Univ. Press 1999) (1989).
Id. at 32.
HEIDEGGER, supra note 4, at 98.
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freedom that must always betray itself as unfree whatever it does.78 For
whichever bell freedom chooses to ring, that bell can never be un-rung.
Collapse is seductive, especially for those who long to end the torment of
distress. Collapse allows universal suffering to depart and then re-enter
the scene metamorphosed into just and necessary suffering. Collapse
allows the questioning of foundations to cease: it is an unwillingness to
wait, an agitated impatience with all further thinking.
Distress and longing arise in the same other-regarding sphere of
life as the phenomenon of the Face. They are the latter’s counterweights,
and they explain why the passage from ethics to justice (much spoken of
as an aspiration by Levinas himself) is not merely difficult, but
impossible. The word “passage” is ambiguous: it signifies both a going
and a way of going. While going (in a spatio-temporal sense) is
undoubtedly an existential imperative for human beings, it is logically
impossible that a way of going could precede the movement from infinite
ethical responsibility to justice. Such a “way” would have to underlie the
actual going in the manner of a path to which the one who goes
surrenders himself in advance. A way between ethics and justice thus
would be a kind of foundation for going that would betray the very idea
of infinite (unbounded) ethical responsibility. Such a betrayal is
inevitable because a truly unbounded responsibility could never find
even the first step on a way that is pre-bounded in principle: a way that
ineluctably leads to remedies for one person’s suffering in the domain of
a justice that is always the engine of suffering for someone else.
In the sphere of international human rights, the passage from
ethical responsibility to justice must always occur by means of a kind of
bad faith. It must always be accompanied by a certain evasive turningaway, not entirely innocent, from the phenomenon of universal human
suffering to the phenomenon of this particular Other’s particular
eruption of suffering. Although universal suffering departs from the I
during and after its collapse into foundations, it must also be said that it
departs in the mode of staying away rather than disappearing altogether.
The absence of universal suffering in the collapse into foundations is, as
it were, a peculiar mode of holding sway: universal suffering is present
in its absence from “official” (well-founded) discourse and practice. It is
like the faint sound of moaning that can sometimes be heard on the wind
if you open your window, tune out the din of daily business, and really
listen.
78

Id. at 108.
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VI. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: THE APORIA OF OUR QUESTIONING
In an aporia a question is never answered, only restated in other
forms. The problem of the longing for foundations has not been
“solved” in these pages, but rather clarified and restated to illuminate
certain deeply tragic aspects of human existence that are obscured
whenever social thought hypostatizes a well-founded movement
corresponding to the grammatical form “A Y B.” If the journey that we
have taken has accomplished its task, then we should be in a position to
see what I will describe metaphorically by a figure drawn from
geometry. What is to be seen lies within a vast ellipse that is defined by
the foci of two questions. The ellipse itself contains the tragedy of
universal human suffering. One of its foci is none other than our first
and guiding question: What is the nature and source of our longing for
foundations for universal human rights? The second foci of the ellipse
transforms the guiding question into a kind of plea. I have thought long
and hard about how to express it, and the best I can do is put it the way a
religious person would: Will God forgive me for what I feel I must do in
the service of a suffering humanity? In the difference between these two
questions can be found a clue to the real nature of tragedy. The tragic
does not come from the will being thwarted by destiny, as is commonly
thought, but by the inevitable metamorphosis of freedom and
responsibility into destiny. However bright the destiny of universal
humanity may appear to us when we are at our most optimistic, it is
always fraught with tragedy for someone.
The only real foundation of human rights is to be found, if at all,
in a world: namely, a world where human beings behave in such a
manner that the criteria for the application of this or that purely
conventional concept of “human rights” are taken to be satisfied. Texts
creating or guaranteeing human rights, whether national or international
in origin, are but means to the end of such a world. As means, these
texts bear a contingent relation to their end—they are but one of the
many possible conditions for the transformation of this world into
another world. Like all means, they neither are a ground of the end to
which they can be directed, nor do they require grounding in their own
right. Human rights texts, like the “contents” that they are thought to
have, dwell in the realm of the merely factual, which is to say a realm of
cause and effect in which ontological foundations do not hold sway.
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Heidegger’s remark that “[t]he ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence”79
may be profitably reconfigured in our context to state that the essence of
a world where human rights exist lies in the very existence of that world:
a sort of true (but profound) tautology. Given that respect for human
rights characterizes a kind of actual comportment in a real world, to seek
foundations for that comportment outside the ways human beings just do
and can comport themselves is to chase a mirage. While reason chases
this mirage, universal human suffering continues. A human rights
practice that does not open its eyes to the ubiquity of concrete human
suffering in the here and now is neither fully human nor fully right. A
human rights practice that does not put compassion in place of justice as
its highest value threatens to sink to the level of ideology and to become
an apology for the vast realm of human suffering that it ignores,
condones, or causes.
All the world’s great religions begin from the standpoint of
universal worldly suffering, but human rights practices begin from the
standpoint of the otherworldly “content” of an Enlightenment conception
of justice. If traditional religion promises otherworldly redemption for
worldly suffering, then human rights practices promise a worldly cure for
only some suffering on the basis of a text whose “content” is less a pregiven ground than it is the mere sum of its applications. The pitiable
man in Kafka’s parable “Before the Law,” like thinkers who yearn for
theoretical foundations for human rights, spends his whole life awaiting
justice for himself and others on the basis of the idea of the Law.80 What
is needed for human rights thinkers to awaken to the real problem of
human suffering is a quasi-religious attention to universal human
suffering, and a radicalized compassion that manages to let go of
obsessive attachment to textual foundations. When that happens, the
reflection that is required for the clarification of foundations will give
way to mindfulness. In mindfulness an open, aware, heedful, and careful
mode of being supplants the rebounding and recoiling movement that is a
reflection bent on nothing more than its own self-refinement.
Mindfulness can never be achieved by means of a refinement of
reflection. Mindfulness can come only when a radically new kind of
compassion at last allows us to open our eyes. This compassion would
not be an occasional intentional effect produced by “empathy.” It would

79
80

HEIDEGGER, supra note 14, at 67.
FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 267-69 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1937).
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be a constant comportment in relation to universal suffering: a constant
attunement to the tragic side of law and justice.
Unfortunately, it is the very uselessness of mindfulness and
compassion for universal suffering that makes them so very difficult for
modern humans to appreciate or achieve, for they lead nowhere in
particular, and thus do not conform to utility’s un-thought yet exclusive
criterion, A Y B. For mainstream (instrumental) thought the possibility
that one might choose to let go of craving attachment to the discourse of
foundations is either extremely threatening or else totally laughable, as is
reflected in the poet J.V. Cunningham’s mocking verse, “This Humanist
whom no beliefs constrained/Grew so broadminded he was scatterbrained.”81 What if, however, Spinoza was right when he said that “all
noble things are as difficult as they are rare”?82 What if the utterly
useless comportment of mindfulness and compassion turned out to be the
rarest and most valuable thing of all? In that case, mindfulness would
neither esteem nor despise justice, but would simply see it, stripped of all
pretension, as but one of the ways that a deluded and suffering humanity
divides the vast ocean of universal suffering into the acceptable and the
unacceptable. For mindfulness, all theories and philosophies that
describe programs to take human beings from here to there are
constructed and received on the basis of a longing that is afraid to
confront itself as a form of suffering. Western thought looks within and
always finds something: the ego cogito (Descartes), the transcendental
conditions of the possibility of experience and of objects (Kant), the
negativity of a freedom that drives the dialectic (Hegel), an ineffable and
chaotic will (Schopenhauer), the will to power (Nietzsche), a Dasein that
is always already “thrown” into a world before all cognition
(Heidegger)—the list goes on and on. The point is that all these various
As are supposed to lead somewhere—to the various Bs that are, in one
way or another, grounded in them as origin. Thought’s craving need to
account for the world in this way is a form of suffering. But what if
thought were to look within and cease to be thought? What if
mindfulness found absolutely nothing (the absence of all origins, all
“somethings”) when it gazed within, and hence nothing that would or
could lead somewhere else?83
81
82
83

THE COLLECTED POEMS AND EPIGRAMS OF J.V. CUNNINGHAM 117 (Swallow Press, 1971).’
SPINOZA, supra note 8, at 280.
Although I am conscious that self-reference by an author can be interpreted as one of the worst
forms of arrogance, I will nonetheless take the risk of saying that the reader who wishes to
explore further the admittedly enigmatic significance of these questions may be interested in
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How painful it would be to experience the death of illusions in
this way, and to let go of the yearning to dominate and control others.
Yet how liberating this would be! For the deepest liberation has nothing
to do with the will’s capacity to make and justify decisions, and
everything to do with the mind’s ability to shed its illusions as if they
were a chrysalis, and to become mindful, at long last, of what it always
already is.

considering my book-length treatment of them in LOUIS WOLCHER, BEYOND TRANSCENDENCE
IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (2005).

